Response to Athens Dialogues: Democracy and Politeia; Dunn and Maksimović
I have been asked, in this
session on ‘Democracy and Politeia’, to respond to
the papers that have been submitted by Professors
John Dunn and Ljubomir Maksimović. Whereas
Professor Dunn’s paper deals with ‘democracy’ as a
legitimate form of government in both the ancient
and modern worlds, that of Professor Maksimović
treats democracy as a negative concept, which
could nevertheless manifest itself in various ways
within the autocratic polity of the Byzantine
empire. The issues that are raised by these two
papers, as well as by others that are offered in
this session, have important implications for our
understanding of political systems in the modern
world. The contribution of Hellenic ideas and
practices to this process is undeniable; it is
striking that this cultural background was able to
devise – and seek to justify – such radically
different forms of government (democracy and
autocracy) in the course of its history.
In this response, I will focus on three issues in
relation to these two papers. Firstly, I would
like to examine the problem of definition,
especially in relation to the concept of
‘democracy’; secondly, I shall briefly address
some historical problems that are raised in these
papers; and finally, I shall attempt – as
instructed by our organisers – to relate the
papers to the issues of modern society.
The first problem that emerges in relation to
both of these papers has to do with definition. Both Dunn and Maksimović employ the term
‘democracy’, but it is important to clarify what
they mean by it. Other abstract terms, such as
‘equality’ and ‘liberty’, also require precise
definition, but I shall focus (for reasons of
time) merely on the problem of ‘democracy’.
As Professor Dunn points out in the introductory
section of his paper, democracy, understood
etymologically, simply means ‘rule by the people
or demos’.
[1] In
fifth-century Athens, ‘the people’ was understood
to mean free, Athenian, male citizens. Modern
definitions of the demos have of course been
expanded to include women, nationalised
immigrants, and many other groups who would not
have been considered eligible members of the
electorate in antiquity. It is also worth noting
that democracy, even in its most limited sense as
a form of political governance, may take such a
variety of forms. The relationship between
fifth-century Athenian democracy, in which the
assembly voted on individual issues and saw their
decisions having immediate effect, and the
different forms of democracy, constitutional or
otherwise, that are practised in the modern world
is complex. The concept of democracy, however,
goes much further than such a simple definition of
the system as an electoral mechanism. Professor
Dunn suggests that democratic governments depend
on notions such as ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ and
‘fairness’. These notions, although remarkably
potent, are – as he also points out – difficult to
verify; they depend more on the fact that
‘democratic’ political systems are propagated by
‘the people’ than by any intrinsic fairness or
equality in their legislation.
[2]
Professor Maksimović adds complexity to our
understanding of the concept by suggesting that
certain phenomena, such as the role of the
‘factions’ in the hippodrome, a respect for human
rights that was built into the legal system, the
possibility of social advancement, and increasing
opportunities for private or corporate enterprise,
represent democratic elements within the Byzantine
political system.
[3] Thus, both
papers suggest that, in addition to meaning ‘rule
by the people’, the concept of democracy includes
a number of values connected with human dignity,
the right to express one’s views, and to advance
within the social order. All of these values,
while certainly associated with democratic
governments at various periods in history, should
be viewed not as intrinsic aspects of the
political system but rather as outcomes which may,
under favourable circumstances, occur. This
distinction should, I think, be kept in mind when
the term ‘democracy’, with all the associations
that it conjures up, is employed.
Secondly, I would like simply to make a few
points that relate to the historical content of
these papers. One of the most important points
that Professor Dunn makes, it seems to me, is that
democracy, even in the ancient world, was not
viewed as intrinsically good, let alone ‘splendid
or sacred’.
[4] He notes in
passing the rather jaundiced view of the ‘Old
Oligarch’, who stated (in connection with late
fifth- and early fourth-century Athenian
democracy) that ‘…the people has no desire to be
enslaved in a well governed city, but to be free
and to rule.’
[5] Commentators
including Thucydides, Plato and Aristotle saw
clearly the risks as well as the benefits of
democracy. The legacy of the Athenian model thus
remained enigmatic, with its justification resting
more on the fact that the people ruled than on the
results of their legislation. Therefore, it is
important to remember that the concept of
democracy as the most just form of political
governance is a relatively modern one. Throughout
the Hellenistic, Roman and medieval periods,
historians and philosophers tended not to claim
moral precedence for any particular form of
government over another; on the contrary,
monarchy, or various mixed forms of constitutional
government, tended to be favoured.
[6] I would also like to make the point that
monarchy, or autocracy, in the ancient and
medieval worlds were probably less centralised and
authoritative than has sometimes been assumed. Here I think that I would go further than
Professor Maksimović in suggesting that the late
Roman and Byzantine emperors delegated power to
provincial governors, city councils, and military
leaders much more than the highly rhetorical
literary sources may lead us to believe. Thus, the
absolute rule of a single monarch or emperor may
have been as determined by practical circumstances
or ‘history’, as Professor Dunn calls it, as
Athenian democracy was.
In conclusion, I would like to suggest that we
think about the implications of these two papers
in relation to the political circumstances of the
twenty-first century. Several problems seem to me
to present significant challenges. Firstly, we
must ask whether the modern nations that maintain
democratic systems of government still share a
common set of values that will lead their
electorates to make enlightened decisions. Whether
this is a shared ethical system (as in ancient
Athens) or a worldview that is based on Roman law
and Christian teachings (as in the Byzantine
empire), the electorate need to understand, and be
prepared to uphold, some vision of society that
embraces more than purely selfish aims. Secondly,
it is necessary to respond to Professor Dunn’s
suggestion that modern governments’ commitment to
‘market forces’ and the acceptance of unregulated
competition between individual or corporate
business interests is intrinsically opposed to
promoting social, economic, and political
equality.
[7] What should certainly be questioned
in the modern context, perhaps, is the common
assumption that democracy is synonomous with
capitalism. It is puzzling that the sectors of the
population that do not, by and large, benefit from
the wealth that is generated by this system
continue to vote for it. The concept of
‘democracy’ – with its unilateral claims of
legitimacy, fairness, and liberty – surely plays a
part here, as do numerous mechanisms, both
practical and rhetorical, that are used to
persuade people that they may ultimately benefit
even from unfair political policies and that they
may eventually join the élites that benefit from
them. Given that democracy is morally neutral,
with its policies being determined by the
prevailing opinions of the electorate and by
historical circumstances, it is clear that a
change in ethical values will have to take place
if a more egalitarian and sustainable vision of
human society is to be inaugurated.
Footnotes
John Dunn, ‘Political
equality: equality of power? Equality in judgment? Equality of exposure? Equality of voice? Distributing a certain equality to equals and
unequals alike’,
Athens Dialogues
E-Journal , p. 2.
Dunn, ‘Political equality’,
esp. pp. 18-19.
Ljubomir Maksimović,
‘Democracy in an autocratic system: the case of
Byzantium’,
Athens Dialogues
E-Journal .
Dunn, ‘Political equality’,
p. 2.
Dunn, ‘Political equality’,
p. 7; (ps-) Xenophon,
The
Constitution of Athens I.8, trans. G. Bowersock (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968).
To focus on the Patristic
period, for example, Eusebius of Caesarea famously
upholds autocracy, or monarchy, as the ideal form
of government for a Christian
empire in his
Oration on the
Tricennalia of Constantine 3.6, writing,
‘And surely monarchy far transcendes every other
constitution and form of government: for that
demoncratic equality of power, which is its
opposite, may rather be described as anarchy and
disorder’, trans. Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers,
Second Series, vol. 1 (Peabody, MA, 1995), p. 584;
while Gregory of Nazianzus writes, ‘Anarchy is
disorderly, and government of the many is
seditious and thus anarchical and thus disorderly. Both result in the same thing – indiscipline – and
this leads to dissolution, for indiscipline is the
practice of dissolution. Monarchy is the opinion
honoured by us, yet a monarchy which one person
does not determine, for it is possible that one
being in dispute with itself comes into a state of
many…’,
Third Theological Oration
Concerning the Son 2, trans. W. G. Rusch,
The Trinitarian
Controversy (Philadelphia, PA, 1980), pp. 131-2.
Dunn, ‘Political equality’,
pp. 14-16.