The Platonic Photographer: The Role of Political Portraiture and the Task of
the Photographer as Author
Introduction: The Portraitist’s Dilemma
I really wanted to show everyone a sense of
intimacy with these people. We all see pictures of them on podiums making
illustrious speeches, or defiant speeches, but we very rarely get close,
we very rarely get to look into their eyes and say “who is this person?”
I am not really talking about politics. I am talking about strength of character here.
Platon Antoniou, interviewed by Blake Eskin (Antoniou 2009)
In September 2009, a staff photographer for the
New Yorker , Platon Antoniou, set up a small makeshift
portrait studio just outside the United Nations building’s green room, in
order to photograph as many as possible of the heads of state who were due
to address the General Assembly. Some cooperated, perhaps remembering him
from previous portrait sittings, as did British Prime Minister Gordon Brown,
whilst others flatly refused, even with hostility. This was the case with
French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who took one look at the photographer’s
makeshift setup and reportedly exclaimed “Je déteste le photo!” (“I hate
photography”) before storming off with his retinue (Antoniou 2009). However,
110 heads of state did indeed cooperate in some form or another, leading to
a portfolio of photographic portraits which is unmatched in both its
attempted global significance and its characteristic snapshot of the
political landscape. The portraits were printed in the
New
Yorker ; 50 of them are included in an interactive portfolio on
the magazine’s Web site. Only the portrait of U.S. President Barack Obama is
not from this session, the President having declined the opportunity to sit
again. Reflecting the fashion for commentary in creative production (such as
director’s commentaries on DVDs), Antoniou’s commentaries for the images
relate to the moment the photograph was taken, and rarely step beyond this
to discuss creative process, as in his interview with Blake Eskin above.
Antoniou’s motivation and outward honesty notwithstanding, it is difficult
not to see the portfolio as a terrific example of the serial presentation of
the political persona, a genre of photography which reaches back as far as
the daguerreotype process in the 1840s and 1850s, having some of its best
exemplars in early portraits of U.S. President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary
of State Daniel Webster. It is Webster’s in particular, by Southworth and
Hawes, which is often held up to be the best example of what Richard
Brilliant has described as the political portrait’s “extraordinary
concurrence of self-representation, artistic interpretation, and viewer
expectation” (Brilliant 1997:56). Like Webster’s daguerreotype, Antoniou’s
images appear full of character, as we would expect them to be, and this is
not achieved through a mere transcription, but through the technical
intervention of the photographer and addressed to the viewer, to us. The
portraitist’s role, it seems, is to engage with the viewer in an
illustration of character, if not an actual investigation or attempt to
“look into their eyes” and “get close.”
Yet despite this, what is startling about the portfolio is the manner in
which Antoniou evacuates or empties out character, empties out biography
even, either willingly or perhaps unwittingly. For example, Italian Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi becomes, in Antoniou’s commentary, simply an
actor enjoying a part he knows how to play very well. His is a performance
for the camera made seemingly in spite of, rather than in concert with, the
creative will of the portraitist, and Antoniou’s exclamation “Berlusconi was
incredible!” may refer as much to Antoniou’s joy as an audience for the
Italian’s performance as to his role as a conveyor of it to others. At best
there is no sense of Antoniou’s getting to the real person (except to offer
suspicions that the performance
is in fact the real
Berlusconi). At worst it resembles what Brilliant suggests is the portrait
as a “battlefield, documenting the struggle for dominance between the
artist’s conception and the sitter’s will,” with Antoniou’s minimal
commentary acting as a petition for surrender (Brilliant 1997:31).
Why should Antoniou find himself in this position? It is perhaps best
understood if we state it as a dilemma which exists in all portraits (not
just photographic portraits, but these express it with specific acuity), and
which relates to the role of the image as a “likeness.” Firstly, a portrait
must be an accurate enough likeness in order to be readable, legible, as a
text. As Alan Trachtenberg suggests, this was the principal expectation from
the earliest days of photographic portraits, since physiognomy is something
we all practice every day, and was particularly popular then: the face was
already always a sign (Trachtenberg 2000:5).
Secondly, however, this legibility requires knowledge—of the person
represented, but more generally an ability to make judgements about the
sitter, their dress, etc., as well as at least some knowledge of the
photographic process. Whilst the portraitist may have specific knowledge of
the sitter, such as their occupation or temperament, the portraitist cannot
guarantee that this is what will be conveyed, and even then that this
knowledge is any greater than that of viewers, who will come to their own
conclusions. The portraitist can only invite the viewer to “fill out and
complete the projective work” (Halliwell 2002:120). Furthermore, few people
still ascribe to any theory of physiognomy by which facial features
represent the inner self of the subject, and fewer would suggest that any
portrait captures the sitter in totality. Portraits ultimately only ever
reveal the materiality of their creation, and photographic
portraits in particular can ever reveal to any degree of certainty only the
physical conditions of exposure (and even this is the subject of much
debate). Ultimately, however, the portraitist’s dilemma is finally
compounded by the sign function of the portrait itself, and the certainty
that it will be read, it wants to be read, and it promises intelligibility
even if this promise is not delivered on. For Brilliant, it is this sign
function normally held by the face which is substituted by the photograph
because of the latter’s uncanny accuracy (Brilliant 1997:40).
Thus we are presented with a peculiarly
Platonic problem in this
example of political portraiture created by Platon Antoniou. And it is the
thoughts of his namesake on which we will depend in order to explore the
dilemma that the political photographic portrait presents within the history
of the medium. Even then, the dilemma may be difficult to resolve. Monroe
Beardsley has observed that it is dangerous to assume that Plato had or
developed a systematic approach to art; that this is made further
problematic by the philosopher’s own shifting use of key terms; that there
are many differing interpretations to be offered that explore concepts
emerging from opposing translations; and that Plato himself may never have
sought to resolve or reconcile different views he held at different times
(Beardsley 1975:31–32). This characterizes much of the intellectual
tradition of Platonism and its interlocutors, and should be recognized
before we apply Plato’s concepts to the photograph as an artwork, technical
image, or simply as a likeness. Although we approach the subject from the
position of critical art history as opposed to classical scholarship, we can
nevertheless draw out some
Platonic observations on the
portraitist’s dilemma, and in particular the mimetic role of the photograph
as political portrait. The prompt here is the relationship the portrait of a
politician has to knowledge—ours and that of the portraitist. Our
exploration is driven by a curiosity about the hope or expectation we have
that the portrait will be a genuine likeness (
eikōn ), and will present by virtue of its accuracy an
opportunity to know the individual, and not the image (
phantasma ) which it undoubtedly is (Beardsley
1975:36).
Photography and the Psychological Portrait
The first question we might ask is this: Is it unexpected
for Antoniou to reject psychological depth (by practice if not by intention)
in his portraits of famous political persons?
In fact, his reluctance mirrors the distance and estrangement of the
portraitists charted by Max Kozloff in his survey of twentieth-century
photography portraiture (Kozloff 2007). Ranging his study from small-town
studio portraitists such as Richard Samuel Roberts, through social
investigations by August Sander, to artists such as Diane Arbus, Kozloff
concludes that all portraitists share the position of “estranger” to their
environment, no matter how close it is to them. Roberts, Sander, et al. were
all “simultaneously involved with and yet dissociated from the world they
depicted. Their affiliations with it were interestingly compromised”
(Kozloff 2007:178). Whether it is recording the banality of small-town life
and its inconsequences (Roberts, or Mike Disfarmer) or the infiltration of a
social class or subculture (Arbus), the portraitist always feels like a
double agent.
In contemporary art photography, the role of the portrait in exploring
psychological depth or the interiority of the sitter has been rejected by
some of the medium’s key practitioners, perhaps most famously by the artist
Thomas Ruff. Trained as a photographer under the great partnership of
architectural photographers Bernd and Hilla Becher (who also taught Andreas
Gursky and Thomas Struth), Ruff’s approach appears to be greatly influenced
by their photographs of industrial architecture, which is reduced through
serial photographs to emanations of form in their repetition of water
towers, mining headframes, or gas tanks. Together, the Becher photographs
reach something close to an illustration of Platonic Ideal forms, in that
the differences between examples, often very few and subtle, seem to present
them as imperfect copies of a constant Ideal. The gas tanks are
eidōla —images of the Ideal form (Beardsley
1975:35). It is
this relationship, between the photographic
image and the subject-as-
eidōlon, which
Ruff explores in his own architectural photographs, in that they similarly
reduce buildings and courtyards to walls that screen the true purposeful
identity of the housing or business location.
Ruff took the same approach to portraiture, perhaps his most famous artworks,
in which he exploits technical competence and high production values to
produce images which simultaneously negate the individuality of the sitter. Each portrait untitled, the works clearly manifest Ruff’s stated denial of
psychological depth in portraits (Behrman 2003:33). Added to this is a
confrontational approach to the process of photography, such as through very
large-scale printing, so that every facial blemish is visible, or else
masked through the use of soft focus. Together with a stripped-away
background, replaced with pure white or monotone, Ruff’s portraits seem to
be responding to Trachtenberg’s observation that “sophisticated looking at
photographs now wants the inscription within the image of signs of its
making, marks of its being a photograph after all and not a timeless truth”
(Trachtenberg 2000:2).
Ruff’s approach, however, is hardly unique, and perhaps reflects the same
kind of anger detectable in one of Walker Evans’s most striking images from
his travels across the United States in the mid-1930s. Known for his
delicately balanced and lyrical style, Evans became one of the leading
figures in American photography in the 1930s, during the period of the New
Deal, travelling across the southern states either on assignment for
Fortune magazine or for the newly formed Farm Security
Administration (FSA). Along with colleagues such as Arthur Rothstein, Ben
Shahn, and Dorothea Lange, he was given detailed instructions on the kinds
and types of photographs he was meant to take, in order to provide material
for the government’s New Deal propaganda (Dyer 2005:15). Whilst on
assignment, he photographed the window display of a local portrait
photographer, and the result—cropped to exclude all but the central display
of 225 sample portraits, overlaid with the word “Studio” from the shop
window—became
Penny Picture Display, Savannah,
Georgia (1936). According to the Museum of Modern Art, the work
represents Evans’s affinity with the “plainspoken vernacular of ordinary
photographers” (Museum of Modern Art 2004:157.). However, Richard Brilliant
detects a pernicious animosity toward – perhaps even a second distancing
from—the small-town photographer, which ultimately leads to the work’s
becoming a predicate by the photographer alone:
The word ‘Studio’
spread across the front expresses Evans’ disregard for the integrity of
the pictures as portraits, but not as objects of representation… When
Evans photographed them he changed their character as one-time
portraits, robbing them of their identity and their names.
Brilliant 1997:54
The removal of the portrait’s name
means that it ceases to function as a portrait at all and instead becomes,
in a different analysis, mimetic of the portrait as an Ideal. In a similar
manner, it is the rending of names from the portraits in Ruff’s work which
allows them into the gallery as a work of art (Grennan 2003:24). They are
freed from the attachment to a particular identity, and freed for their
purpose as artistic statements.
For Trachtenberg, the dissociation of the artist as photographer from the
portrait as a carrier of meaning was also precipitated by the theoretical
explorations of the gallery and the academy in the 1970s and 1980s; an
effect of postmodern debates and postmodern practices. For example, in
practice it is undoubtedly the photography of Cindy Sherman which has done
the most to reconfigure our approach to the portrait as a carrier of inner
meaning. Sherman’s work, like that of Barbara Kruger, Jo Spence, and Annie
Sprinkle after her, serves to recapitulate and dismantle the codes of
advertising, commercial portraiture, and pornography and relay them back to
us, in a manner no less effective than the critical writings of John Berger,
Laura Mulvey, and Judith Williamson (Berger 1972; Mulvey 1975; Williamson
1985). That the public gaze is sexualised as male in the public sphere is
difficult to dispute, but this work, like Sherman’s photographic
self-portraits, reveals the craft of photography which must be mastered, and
this is a craft of appearances.
Whilst Sherman has, on occasion, also refused to engage in any psychological
or critical subtext to her staged self-portraits, in which she plays the
role of a female archetype (a film actress in a scene, a photographic model,
a victim of sexual abuse), she has nonetheless invested them with a studied
performance. In a series from 2000–2003 which explicitly addresses the
small-town studio portrait, Sherman portrays an array of suburban housewives
and mistresses, shot against a monotone background, playing off the surface
masquerade constructed from hair dye, fake tan, and cosmetic surgery, so
that the archetype is an aging woman whom the artist describes as “still hot
in her mind” (Ewing and Hirschdirfer 2008:112–113).
Monotone is an almost constant signifier within the studio portrait, whether
pure white or (more rarely) black, shaded to a particular colour, or
appropriately neutral and even scientific. Most often as a screen or coving
stretched behind the sitter, sometimes backlit to bleach out in exposure, it
has the twin effect of concentrating signification onto the face, yet at the
same time often signifying by itself how the personality of the subject can
barely be contained. This is the conclusion Brilliant draws from his
analysis of Albrecht Dürer’s portrait of Philip Melancthon (1526), in which
the artist places the theologian’s head against the sky, suggesting great
intelligence (Brilliant 1975:75). However, in another analysis, it also
suggests the mind’s proximity to God, and given Melancthon’s theology the
emergence of an independent mind. This disposition of blank space within the
portrait is certainly echoed in the work of Nadar and Julia Margaret Cameron
in the nineteenth century, and by photographers such as Irving Penn and
Richard Avedon in the twentieth. Nadar’s most famous portraits, of Sarah
Bernhardt and Charles Baudelaire, strip the environment bare in order to
focus attention on the creative mind revealed in the face. Bernhardt’s
portrait (1865) is the furthest the actress could be from the staged
character portraits of her which sold in their thousands, photographed as
she is by Nadar emerging almost without adornment from a luxurious velvet
robe that lifts off the background.
Max Kozloff recounts in his survey how Penn surfaced in the Peruvian town of
Cuzco in order to shoot one of his most famous assignments for
Vogue . Depicting local inhabitants against a portable
grey backdrop, the images recall ethnographic studies of the nineteenth
century. Penn apparently seemed “unconcerned” with the attachment of his
works to this cultural history of visual colonialism and, demonstrating a
startling lack of intellectual curiosity about his subjects, presented them
merely as exotica (Kozloff 2007:192). Yet it is Avedon’s use of the sheer,
brilliant white background in his portraiture which seldom fails to stop
critics in their tracks, primarily because of Avedon’s oft-quoted disavowal
(like Ruff after him) of any capacity of photography to reveal any
interiority, any psychological depth: “Surface is all you’ve got” (Sobieszek
1999:136).
Avedon’s words are so disarming perhaps because his portraits of the famous,
developed as an extension of his work as a fashion photographer, often
appear to capture the character of the sitter so well, earning him praise
for studies of the Duke and Duchess of Windsor (apparently achieved through
subterfuge) and Ezra Pound (a stolen moment appears to capture the poet in
ecstasy) (Kozloff 2007:194). Avedon, like Penn before him, often transported
his studio setup around his subjects’ homes and places of work, perhaps most
famously for his project
In the American West
(1985), extracting the individual from their surroundings and thus verging
on a serious investigation of humanity. However, Avedon’s own recognition of
his role as “
mimêtikos ,” as someone who
imitates, empties out any connection with the Ideal that these subjects
share, since he reminds us that the photograph is always a
mistaken identity (Belfiore 1984:125). We never get to the
real person since the “surface is all you’ve got.”
White-Out: Reading into the Political Portrait
Given the tendency of high-profile photographers to back
away from interiority or psychological depth in their portraits, we can ask
a new question of Antoniou’s work, and of the political portrait more
generally: Does the role of the photographer
matter in the
political portrait, where psychological depth might be all-important?
Antoniou’s choice of a white background for many of his images carries more
significance than simply as a nod to Avedon, Penn, or the codes of fashion
photography. It connects his images with both Renaissance portraiture and
the new technologies of the state. For example Norbert Schneider, in his
survey of Renaissance portraiture, locates the emergence of the
psychological portrait in the work of Lorenzo Lotto, and in particular his
Man Before a White Curtain (1508). This would
be remarkable enough, given Lotto’s subordinate career in the shadow of
Giorgione or Titian, were it not for the stark composition and the
disposition of the portrait’s elements: the bust of the man is portrayed in
three-quarters profile, with extraordinary photorealist accuracy, against a
white damask curtain drawn almost fully behind him. The composition easily
prefigures the style of Antoniou, Avedon, and perhaps Ruff most of all, but
its similarity to (of all things) the modern passport photograph perhaps
teaches us the most about how important the background is in the portrait.
Modern passport photographs have undergone a change few may have noticed in
recent years (certainly in the UK). Ten or twenty years ago, passport
photographs could be produced at high-street portraitists and in
coin-operated photobooths, with some degree of choice of background and
aspect. Since then we have seen the requirement to remove not only our smile
but spectacles and other adornments, since they are assumed to cover or hide
our “real” face, the face that provides legal, biological, or social
information for use by the state. Similarly, if one casts one’s mind back,
we might remember the blue or orange curtain which could be drawn across the
background of the photograph. Like the damask curtain in Lotto’s painting,
this curtain’s texture, and its proximity to the sitter, often made it
appear to merge with the sitter on the surface of the image, denying
three-dimensional space (and perhaps therefore denying interiority). In the
intervening years, the curtain too has been removed in favour of the pure
white background now required for most state photographs. This is likely to
have happened so that they can be read by machines, reminding us of the
image’s relationship to measurement in Socrates’ Ideal City, in which
measurement counteracts the potential for images to deceive:
Measuring, counting, and weighing have happily been discovered to
help us out of these difficulties, and to ensure that we should not be
guided by apparent differences of size, quantity and heaviness, but by
calculations of number, measurement, and weight.
Republic 10.602d, trans. Lee
But this change
is no less significant because the curtain in the passport photograph, like
that in Lotto’s sixteenth-century portrait, is
behind the
sitter. The white background now appears to guarantee access to the real in
photography, in a reverse transfer of significance from state photograph to
the aesthetic portrait. At the same time, the curtain is suggested as
veiling, or hiding, some aspect of intelligible character, personality, or
quality which would otherwise be discernible. The significance of the
curtain for Schneider is exactly so: it is pulled back enough to reveal a
symbolic candle, suggesting for him a clear message about the character of
Lotto’s sitter (“And the light shineth in darkness,” John 1, 5). But also it
stands as an example of the emergence of the psychological portrait because
of the ambiguity it creates:
Reference to the ‘psychological’
portrait here should not be understood in the modern sense of the
epithet. The visual medium chosen by Lotto to portray mental states was
less one of analytical disclosure than its opposite: enigma.
Schneider 1994:67
The curtain comes to represent
enigma in the passport photograph, so its removal (in favour of white space
in Antoniou) suggests exactly the reverse direction from what we see in
Lotto. It will guarantee analytical disclosure, as if to say “there is no
deceit here, no attempt to conceal, everything to be read is legible on its
face, since the background has disappeared.” And in this case, it appears to
have done so literally. Unlike the use of backgrounds in Nadar and Penn, the
illuminated white background of Avedon and Antonio ceases to exist and
becomes empty space. However, whereas for Avedon the white space signalled
only surface (the background is still a screen, still merges with the
sitter), for Antoniou it is a void which is instrumental in reaching the
person behind the politician; an analytical disclosure reliant upon just
this ambiguity of surface and transparency. The halo or vignetting of this
white space—a process performed after the shoot—serves only to accentuate
this: the space is empty of signification and can be freely manipulated.
The
Portraits of Power series is representative of
Antoniou’s distinctive studio style, albeit transported in practice from the
studio to the United Nations building. Antoniou was born in London in 1968,
and spent much of his early childhood in Athens before returning to the UK,
eventually enrolling in art school at Central St Martins to read Fine Art
and later Graphic Design. After some time spent trying to get work at UK
Vogue , he was eventually accepted into the
prestigious Fine Art Photography Masters programme at the Royal College of
Art, from where he graduated in 1992. Eschewing the theoretical approach to
photography which was emerging in London at that time (photography
scholarship was heavily influenced by what had become known as the “New
Photography” [Webster 1980] ), Antoniou nevertheless found work at
Vogue ,
The Face ,
Arena, and eventually
George ,
Esquire, and the
New
Yorker in the United States, where he moved in 1998. Antoniou’s
work is praised by
Esquire ’s director of
photography Nancy Iacoi as “making his subjects look iconic” while at the
same time bringing a “unique intimacy between the subject and viewer”
(Kostaki 2003:61). Indeed it was for
Esquire in
2000 that Antoniou produced one of his defining images: a colour photograph
of outgoing U.S. President Bill Clinton, hands resting on his knees, looking
down at the camera whilst the end of his sky-blue tie rests libidinously on
his crotch.
Antoniou’s distrust of theoretical or critical approaches to photography in
favour of praxis is exemplified in the written commentaries he provides in
Platon’s Republic , his first monograph of
collected commissions (Antoniou 2004). These betray lack or emptying out of
knowledge in order to make the human encounter appear more important, by
bringing each photograph and its circumstances to the same level. The
difficulty with this approach, however, is that the commentary rarely
explores the subject on any biographical level, probably because it is
difficult or impossible for the photographer to have sufficient knowledge to
allow the viewer to “read into” the portrait. “Reading into” a portrait is
Richard Brilliant’s account of how the ambiguities of likeness are a fertile
ground for projecting identification, particularly where there is an
historical ambiguity or misrecognition (as in a disputed likeness in
painting or sculpture). “Reading into” is fundamental to the process of
“reading out” from a portrait all the desired qualities which the viewer
admires in the real person (Brilliant 1997:80). What this entails is for
viewers to invest in the portrait as a likeness, even in the midst of
historical or technical ambiguity, in order for it to stand metonymically
for the sitter’s values or qualities. Put another way, in the context of
Antoniou’s work the ambiguity of the white background is essential for his
portraits to produce a sense of connection or mimesis of the “truth” of the
person depicted. However, without Antoniou’s knowledge (in the form of
biographical information, for example), this promise remains unfulfilled,
because the photographer either does not know or shies away from providing
it.
This leads to some peculiar situations in
Platon’s
Republic , which prefigure the awkwardness of the
Portraits of Power commentaries. The portrait of
Senator Edward Kennedy, for example, is accompanied by a commentary largely
about his makeup artist, who had worked for “nearly every president since
JFK,” whereas any serious discussion of the larger-than-life representative
of one of the United States’ most famous political dynasties is reduced to a
description of the “sad vulnerable quality in his face” (Antoniou
2004:n.p.). A more startling omission is evident in the comparison between
two of the public faces of U.S. conservatism. The photographs of neo-Nazi
skinheads in North Carolina is accompanied by an evocative description of
the fearful photographer’s edgy encounter with them, framed by an ethical
riposte from Antoniou that it is important to record and document these
groups as much as any other. By comparison, Antoniou’s portrait of
Republican Senator Jesse Helms (also from North Carolina) is accompanied by
the briefest of accounts:
The congressman was very frail. This was
his last active day before retiring. He was one of the longest serving
senators in US history.
Antoniou 2004:n.p.
Helms was
a notable hard-line conservative, who was at one point instrumental in what
came to be known as the “culture wars,” campaigning against the provision of
funding for healthcare research into AIDS, or funding from the National
Endowment for the Arts to artists such as Robert Mapplethorpe (Meyer 2003). There may have been other reasons why the commentary is so short, but this
does not diminish the starkness of the comparison. The reason for this
disparity may be one of many: Antoniou, perhaps knowing of Helms’s
substantial public image, may not have felt it necessary to add anything
further than the simplest of comments; or the session itself may have been
unremarkable or the sitter unapproachable; or (perhaps as a consequence of
both of these reasons) Antoniou may have found the prospect of providing any
depth to his comments objectionable. For instance, the resulting impression
of the neo-Nazis is perhaps adequately critical, perhaps even necessarily
sensational. But it is hard to imagine a less engaging ethical or
biographical note than that on the Senator, who arguably had greater agency,
reach, and impact in conservative politics than many in his lifetime.
Perhaps the reason for this difference lies in the fact that Helms is named,
whereas his fellow Carolinians are not. To shoot a political portrait is to
do so in the knowledge that the portrait will signify specific things for
any viewer who has knowledge of the subject, and political portraits invite
an emphasis on biography more than do those of celebrities. This is perhaps
because, as some cognitive research has suggested, there is a high degree of
consequentiality in the lives of politicians, and in our relationships to
them. This is one of the factors in the emergence of theories such as
“flashbulb memory,” which has been used to account for the fact that so many
people who were alive at the time have detailed answers to the question:
“where were you when you heard Kennedy was assassinated?” (Brown and Kulik
1977:77; Sutton 2009:47–48). The lives of politicians are significant
because they
mean something to us , not merely in an
aspirational or sensational way, but in a biological way. Politicians may
make decisions which affect our ability to earn money, protect and support
our family, speak our mind, or be socially and practically mobile. They may
also make decisions which prove wrong, change their minds, or demonstrate
failings or frailty, all of which may necessarily have consequences for us. For this reason alone, the political portrait invites a biographical reading
more than any other, since in the lines on a politician’s face there simply
seems to be more for us to read.
Knowing that his portraits will undoubtedly be made intelligible by
interested viewers, based on the principle of consequentiality, may account
to some extent for Antoniou’s stepping back from biographical detail or
investigation in the
Portraits of Power
commentaries. He may know very well about the life and impact of Evo Morales
(Bolivia), Gordon Brown, Robert Mugabe (Zimbabwe), or Muammar al-Qaddafi
(Libya), but feels he need do no more than relay his encounter to the
knowledgeable viewer. So the encounter with Qaddafi yields a story of the
intimidating circumstances of his arrival—close enough to the arrival of the
U.S. President to raise security concerns—and provide for an otherwise
disarming interview between awestruck photographer and awesome subject. Alternatively, his encounter with Morales leaves Antoniou speechless, to the
extent that his tale is about the photograph, as he problematically renders
Morales as the spectacular, exotic Other “coming out of darkness”; whilst
Mugabe’s skin is described as shiny or waxy, or made of glass, to the extent
that its “blue, icy” quality becomes metonymic of nefarious and unseen acts
and deeds. In Antoniou’s photograph and its attendant commentary, Mugabe’s
skin becomes a canvas for the viewer.
On the other hand, Antoniou continues to express a desire to connect with his
sitters, most effectively illustrated in his commentary on the portraits of
Gordon Brown and Irish Taoiseach Brian Cowen, both of whom demonstrate an
avuncular quality in the narrative if not actually in the image. The
commentary on Brown is tragic-comic, as it appears to trump reports of the
British Prime Minister as socially difficult, whilst the commentary on Cowen
is illustrative of the roles of both photographer and the politician as
wilful “estrangers” who meet by circumstance:
I know nothing about his
life, he knows nothing about mine, and yet there is an intimacy between
us, in this crazy situation with all these world leaders wandering
around.
(Antoniou 2009; commentary for Brian
Cowen)
The black and white portraits in the series have a particular quality to
their production that recalls the photorealist painting of Chuck Close. This
is especially so with the portraits of Brown, Jacob Zuma (South Africa), and
Benjamin Netanyahu (Israel), which echo in composition Close’s
Self-portrait of 1968. That painting was in turn based
upon a black and white photograph of Close, shot from below his eyeline and
framing him against a pure white background. Close’s photo-mechanical
approach involves scaling up the photograph to an immense size and
transferring it to canvas by hand, or by using application techniques that
emphasize both the automatism of photography and its requirement for human
action. The philosopher Kendall Walton chose the Close self-portrait to
illustrate his thesis on the nature of the photograph and its transparency. The painting, for Walton, does this because it looks like a photograph, but
when its true nature is revealed, “we feel somehow less ‘in contact with’
Close when we learn that the portrayal of him is not photographic” (Walton
1984:255).
Whilst this reading of it neglects the commentary Close’s painting clearly
makes about the requirement of human intervention in all aspects of
photography, it nonetheless illustrates for us the ways in which photography
is assumed to put us in contact with the person depicted. In so doing,
photography achieves “contact” in a manner more akin to the religious icon,
wherein the image is a manifestation, rather than an accurate depiction, and
where causation is
acheiropoietic (meaning “not made by hands”
and thus the direct action of God), and channelled through the artist and
their production. This is the conclusion reached by both Trachtenberg and
Cynthia Freeland, who alight on the portrait as “manifestation” via the work
of Patrick Maynard (Maynard 1997; Trachtenberg 2000:10; Freeland 2010:48).
The confluence of Walton’s approach and that of Maynard et al. is in the
sense of contact that Walton suggests we get from the photograph. Later
scholars, such as Scott Walden, have argued that despite the myriad forms of
manipulation which a photographic can undergo, this contact still remains in
the form of an “information channel” which is subject to degradation,
counteracted by a belief in aspects of the photograph’s depiction as
“warranted” (Walden 2005:271). However, whilst Walton and Walden base their
arguments on an ocular phenomenon of the photographic image—we see through
photographs to the world beyond—their reasoning relies heavily on an
acheiropoietic reading of manifestation, wherein the sitter provides the
causation of the portrait independent of the portraitist’s decision-making
or mental state (Freeland 2010:57). This means that a likeness can look
dramatically different from the person manifested (indeed, icons should be
seen as expressions, rather than representations), since it is governed by
an emotional connection rather than by its correspondence with its
prototype. This makes the relationship between the interested viewer and the
political portrait tendentious, and the situation of the portraitist a
precarious one.
A Truth Impossible to Bear
In this final section, we can now address Plato’s philosophy
directly by restating the portraitist’s dilemma as a new question: Does the
photographer produce a portrait as the acheiropoeitic imitation (
eikōn ) of the sitter, here a politician, at
the expense of the their intermediary role as an artist, or does the
photographer offer a portrait from a particular point of view, and thus
provide a deceptive imitation that provides little but surface information
(
phantasma )?
This precarious situation refers of course to Socrates’ dialogue in
Republic 10, and his accusation of anyone engaged in
representation as being “a long way removed from truth … and able to
reproduce everything because it has little grasp of anything” (10.598b,
trans. Lee). After all, Socrates suggests, if such a person “really knew
about the things he represented, he would devote himself to them entirely
and not to their representations” (10.599b, trans. Lee). As Eva Schaper
points out, this book of the
Republic brings into
focus Plato’s multivalent approach to the arts in general, and poetry in
particular, which appears at various stages in the
Apology ,
Gorgias, Sophist, Phaedrus,
and (particularly for Schaper) the
Ion . At
stake is the romantic figure of the artist as suffering from divine
inspiration, which raises his work above the level of mere technical
competence, but which denies him access to the “really real” of Ideal forms
(Schaper 1968:34). From the
Ion , Schaper draws out
a teleology of the romantic heritage, “whenever art is praised for saying
something instead of talking about it,” which serves to explain how Plato
was taken up by the Romantics in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries (Schaper 1968:36). For this, Schaper draws upon a speech Plato
gives to Socrates in his dialogue with the rhapsode Ion, in which the
philosopher describes the divine inspiration that seizes these poets who in
turn inspire others, creating a chain with the Muse at its head. Socrates
likens the poet to priests in a fuguelike state,
so the lyric poets
are not in their right mind when they are composing their beautiful
strains: but when falling under the power of music and metre they are
inspired and possessed; like Bacchic maidens who draw milk and honey
from the rivers when they are under the influence of Dionysus but not
when they are in their right mind. And the soul of the lyric poet does
the same, as they themselves say; for they tell us that they bring songs
from honeyed fountains, culling them out of the gardens and dells of the
Muses; they, like the bees, winging their way from flower to flower. And
this is true. For the poet is a light and winged and holy thing, and
there is no invention in him until he has been inspired and is out of
his senses, and the mind is no longer in him: when he has not attained
to this state, he is powerless and is unable to utter his oracles.
Plato Ion 534a–b, trans. Jowett
Schaper’s interpretation of this passage is that Plato
hereby assigns the poet a “special position outside knowledge,” which leads
to the Romantic notion that the artist becomes the “guardian and trustee of
feeling.” However, it underlines the deep suspicion of the poet in Plato,
which reaches its pivotal moment in
Republic 10,
since if the poet is beyond reason, and can communicate feeling and
expression without true knowledge, “the very force of his emotions by which
he is swept opens for him direct access to the emotions of others. He
becomes an artist in emotional infection” (Schaper 1968:38).
For Schaper, the
Ion, and especially
Republic 10, set up a significant tension among three
distinct roles for the poet which have been drawn out by scholars ever
since. Either the poet is in a fuguelike state, from which images emanate
acheiropoietically, or the poet is able to produce emotions which are
without true knowledge and are thus wholly deceptive, or (perhaps the most
attractive in the visual arts) the poet is especially sensitive to feeling
and emotion as truth (a “winged thing” harvesting fruit from the garden of
the Muse, pollinating as it goes).
Schaper certainly uses the
Ion to suggest a
potential separation in Plato’s philosophy of the higher arts from craft
as
tekhnē , leading to the possibility
that Plato is prescient of the ways in which this would happen under the
Romantics or even as part of European Modernism. This approach is resisted
by others, such as Suzanne Stern-Gillet (2004), who point to the same
passage as suggestive of the poet’s being subject to the whim of the Muse. Relating this to the principle earlier developed in the
Ion of the poet as lodestone, which cannot help but point to
the Muse (as a magnet cannot help but point north), any inspiration is
beyond the intention of the artist. Artistic pollination, in this regard, is
interpreted as a much more random and aleatory process (Stern-Gillet
2004:174).
Stephen Halliwell, on the other hand, does note how Plato’s frequent use of
irony suggests that the attack is a specific challenge for others to come to
the poet’s defence on the basis of meaning and value (Halliwell 2002:138). However, we might ask if it is appropriate at all to develop a critique of
the portraitist, particularly the photographer, that is predicated on the
Romantic notion of the artist. This is especially problematic when dealing
with a named portrait: an artist who removes the name from a portrait might
give themselves the opportunity to gain access to universal concepts or
Ideal Forms, according to Schaper’s reading. However, as Beardsley suggests,
drawing on Plato’s
Laws , an imitation will always
be read in relation to the viewer’s knowledge of the subject, and measured
on correctness in order to establish value (Beardsley 1975:46). This is
undoubtedly the case with the named portrait, for which knowledge of the
sitter (by way of biography, including consequentiality) becomes the ruler
against which the image is measured.
Put another way, at first glance the photographer is deceiving us, whether
cognitively or otherwise. Whilst it is unlikely that a photograph is ever
taken to be the actual person in the flesh (Walton’s “contact” still relies
upon the photograph’s being understood cognitively as a photograph), it is
easy to forget its role as a versatile imitation. This is suggested by
Elizabeth Belfiore’s reading of
mimêtikos
as the focus of Plato’s opprobrium in
Republic 10,
when she notes the fact that “Plato calls the imitator both an imitator
of
eidôla (sounds or shapes), at
10.600e, for example, and a maker of
eidôla , at 10.599a” (Belfiore 1984:124). This allows Belfiore
to draw a distinction between “imitation with knowledge” made by craftsmen
for use value, and “versatile imitation” which is predicated on the mistaken
identity caused by its mimesis of real emotions and feelings. A photographer
in our study might at first glance be understood as a maker of shapes, due
to the technical manufacture of the image, but they might also be considered
an imitator of sounds and shapes, not just because they present an imitation
of a person which is mistaken for the real thing (“contact”), but even if
any kind of personal connection is perceived, it is with something that is
already a performance or imitation: the politician.
In dealing with the complexity of various meanings that Plato ascribed to
mimēsis, Beardsley notes how the notion of the politician as people’s
representative suggests that much more is at stake when we consider the role
of mimesis as a performance of the people’s will (Beardsley 1975:34). This
suggestion has the unfortunate sideeffect of placing the portraitist in the
position of the rhapsode in relation to the politician as poet, depending on
one’s interpretation of Plato’s criticism. Certainly, if one subscribed to
the popular idea of the politician as lacking in true character or dealing
merely with surface appearances which are mistaken for the truth, then one
might be sympathetic with this account. It identifies the portraitist as
being in collusion with such a deception, a terrible suspicion which might
lead to the photographer disowning the photograph or its apparent
psychological depth. The photographer is simply one link in the lodestone
chain, always further removed from the truth by one degree than the sitter. Perhaps then it does indeed help to think of the photographer in terms of
the poet/rhapsode, as engaged in a performance, rather than in relation to
the painter. By the time Plato reaches his special admonition of the
imitator in
Republic 10, the role of the poet and
the painter are virtually interchangeable, such as whe n Socrates slips
easily from poets to painters in his discussion of the imitation of
craftsmen, for example: “the poet can use words and phrases as a medium to
paint a picture of any craftsman” (10.601a, trans. Lee). The implication in
this discussion is clear, the poet is at one remove from the craftsman,
whose work can be measured against “quality, beauty and fitness” (10.601d,
trans. Lee), whereas the imitation cannot. But we are prompted to respond to
this by the nature of the relationship between photographer and sitter as a
battleground, a compromise, or better still a contract. This is indicated in
the history of honorific portraiture, from which the traditions of both
lofty painted portraits as well as small-town photographic portraits
emerged. Here, we must remember, the photograph is always the result of some
kind of concord or agreement, even if it is for services rendered by the
portraitist, and even if it rests in the unspoken intimacy of lovers. It is
also prompted by the attention Plato gives to the role of craftsmen and
subsequent interpretations of
tekhnē as a
success word, “which can only denote a rational and cognitive activity”
(Stern-Gillet 2004:187).
For Stern-Gillet, Plato is unhelpfully praised for separating
tekhnē from art in a hierarchy that places it
below, rather than above, divine inspiration. Instead, she draws a useful
justification model that employs, as a guiding principle, its relationship
to function (use) as the Ideal Form:
From the evidence of [ Phaedrus , Protagoras, and
Gorgias ], we may infer that an activity
ranks as a τέχνη if: (1) it aims at
truth; (2) it embodies general principles on the nature of its
subject-matter or defining activity; (3) it derives from such principles
standards of excellence; (4) it is concerned with the good of its object
or recipient; (5) it can give a rational account of itself; and (6) it
can be imparted by teaching.
Stern-Gillet 2004:187
Its concern for the truth rather than appearances, from a position of
knowledge rather than opinion, places
this reading of tekhnē on the higher level ethically, and
closer to calculations performed by reason rather than appearance. All the
practical aspects of photography fit this reading, since it can be imparted
by teaching, can give a rational account (i.e. the manufacture of a
photograph can be discerned from the image by the trained eye), and it
generally corresponds to its subject matter. After all, as the history of
portraits of Lincoln demonstrates, photography is intimately tied to the
public perception of modern politicians and their ability to represent the
will of the people. Similarly, it would be an unusual portrait which was not
concerned with the “good of its object or recipient,” either where the
portrait attempts to show the subject in their best light (which may also
lean closer to deception, of course), or where the portrait attempts to
provide a lesson for the subject or recipient, as in caricature. Similarly,
it would be an unusual portrait which did not attempt to pass on, for the
benefit of the recipient, some form of knowledge about the sitter, whether
named or not.
We have seen how the removal of the name from the portrait is an act of
distancing the photograph from the problem of surface appearances. This is
perhaps because identity is already a performance on one level (as we saw
with Sherman), and an imperfect copy of the Ideal on another. If Antoniou
were to remove the names of his sitters, it might also be able to reach this
sense of the real, and it might achieve a level of truth adequate to
Stern-Gillet’s justification of
tekhnē.
However, to do so, to rend the name from the political portrait, might
prevent any of the communicative, educative value intended by the
New Yorker , in the first instance, and perhaps even by
the politician as well. This is why it is more useful to consider Antoniou
as a performer, contracted to produce a particular likeness. If he diverged
from his trademark style he might not be awarded commissions or be able to
sell his work. In addition, the starkness of these portraits, necessary in
order to signify direct access (nothing hidden), might be exactly what is
appealing to a magazine. To diverge from this too far might be to offer too
much surface. This is perhaps why the signs of production (in particular the
halo or vignette) encroach on the sitter, as if to say: “everything else was
as you see it.”
In this respect, we might ask finally what a portraitist such as Antonio
knows , if his commentaries demonstrate an absence of
biography and of critical opinion on the political positions of his
subjects. We might say, because of his situation vis-à-vis the magazine,
that his knowledge is that of presentation and performance, and his
particular craft is the production (in the theatrical as well as the visual
sense of the word) of the political portrait. This sometimes presents him
with encounters in which he is unhappily complicit in the production of a
political identity. Perhaps after all this is the case in his experiencing
the deliberate and mannered gestures of Muammar al-Qadaffi, or observing the
contrast between the dour Gordon Brown of popular opinion and the image
which is produced and which, no matter how relaxed Brown’s smile, can never
subvert the myth already created. Similarly, the commentaries on Berlusconi
and Mugabe (as with Helms) demonstrate a flinching or squinting in the face
of a political presence, and suggest something more telling of the
relationship between portraitist and sitter: the portraitist, rather than
being a link in a chain to the Muse, or producing acheiropoietic images of a
subject which reveals itself, is actually a partner in the politician’s
craft of representation. This is the truth of the photograph as political
portrait, but it is a truth that may be impossible to bear.
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